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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
have unwritten differences in areas such as whether certain injuries are
considered work related or whether certain surgery may be required.17 Fur-
ther, an injured worker in need of compensation may have neither the time
nor resources to survey the applicable compensation acts. The worker's
employer would be of little help in a survey of compensation acts as em-
ployers have an interest in limiting compensation costs and thus may
suggest an employee apply for compensation in a state with lower bene-
fits s98
In recognition of the difficulties faced by injured workers, many courts
have stated a policy of interpreting workmen's compensation acts for the
benefit of the injured worker." The Fourth Circuit in Pettus, however, by
effectively requiring the injured worker to survey available benefits and
then risk losing benefits because of unanticipated events, 00 has interpreted
the Virginia Act in favor of the employer.
SAMUEL A. FLAx
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. First Amendment Rights of Public Employees
Traditionally, a public employee has not enjoyed the full measure of
constitutional rights afforded to private citizens. Justice Holmes
summarized the basis of the courts' early denials of otherwise cognizable
constitutional claims by public employees when he noted that a person
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but that person has no
right to be a policeman.' Holmes' distinction between constitutionally
protected rights of private citizens and unprotected governmental
privileges allowed governments to condition employment upon terms
which denied employees rights they enjoyed as citizens.2 The Supreme
,7 At the time the Pettus plaintiff sought relief under the Virginia Act, he probably did
not anticipate that he would be forced to undergo surgery, that he would refuse to undergo
that surgery, and that his refusal would be unjustified in Virginia but reasonable in the
District of Columbia. See text accompanying notes 10-19 supra.
" The potential for an unscrupulous employer to deprive an injured worker of available
benefits is obvious. In Magnolia, the claimant was confined to a hospital bed and told to sign
a certain form if he wished to receive workmen's compensation benefits. The claimant appar-
ently was unaware that the form restricted recovery to the Texas Act. 320 U.S. at 450 (Black,
J., dissenting). See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
" See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n of Wis. v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 628 (1947); Pettus v.
American Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 627, 632 (4th Cir., 1978) (Hall, J., dissenting); Wheatley v.
Adler, 407 F.2d 307, 313-14 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
' See note 97 supra.
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892). In
McAuliffe, a policeman challenged his dismissal under a regulation which limited his politi-
cal activities. See Van Alstyne, The Demise Of The Right-Privilege Distinction In Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HRv. L. REv. 1439, 1439-40 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
2 See Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 1440-41. In a famous application of the distinction
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Court employed this right-privilege distinction in 1952, upholding a state
law that made anyone who was classified as a subversive ineligible for
employment as a teacher.3
In 1967, however, the Supreme Court held that public employment
may no longer be conditioned on the surrender of constitutional rights
which could not be abridged by direct government action.4 Public
employees, such as policemen and teachers, are not relegated to a
"watered down" version of constitutional rights.s Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the state has a greater interest in
regulating expression of its employees than in regulating the expression of
the general public.' In Pickering v. Board of Education,7 the Supreme
Court used a balancing test to reconcile the competing interests of a
teacher in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interests
of the State in the efficiency of its services.8 Although the Court expressly
refused to enunciate a definite standard for judging statements made by
public employees, Pickering did set out general guidelines for analysis.9
between the right to constitutional protection and the privilege of working, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee held that a teacher could not constitutionally challenge a regulation
which prohibited the teaching of evolution. The court held that the fourteenth amendment
did not hamper the state in dealing with public employees in their working capacity. Scopes
v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 109-10, 289 S.W. 363, 364-65 (1927); see also Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (first amendment guarantees free
speech and assembly, but does not guarantee government employement).
Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952); see Note, First Amendment Rights
and Teacher Dismissal: A Survey, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 392, 392-93 (1977).
4 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). Keyishian expressly re-
jected Adler's premise that employment with the state could be conditioned on a forfeiture
of constitutional rights, 385 U.S. at 606 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)).
Shelton invalidated an Arkansas statute which required a teacher to list all organizational
memberships as a condition of employment. The Court held that the statute violated the
teacher's right to free association, a right closely related to freedom of speech and one which
is basic to a free society. 364 U.S. at 486; see Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 1449-51.
' Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967). Garrity held that a state cannot use
the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence from an employee. Id. at 499. The
Court specified that the state may not condition the exercise of first amendment rights upon
the exaction of a price. Id. at 500. See Lovell. v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938);
Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1978).
6 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); cf. Brown v. Glines, 48
U.S.L.W. 4095 (1980) (Air Force regulations requiring prior command approval for circulat-
ing petitions on military bases do not violate servicemen's first amendment rights).
7 Id.
' Id. at 568. In Pickering, the teacher sent a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the
way the Board of Education had handled several bond issue proposals. Additionally, the
letter criticized the Board's allocation of funds between the school's education and athletic
programs. Id. at 566. The Board charged that numerous statements in the letter were false,
and dismissed the teacher. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Board of Education could
not lawfully discharge the teacher unless the Board could show "actual malice" as defined in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 391 U.S. at 569. Actual malice is
knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
376 U.S. at 279-80; see Stevens, Balancing Speech and Efficiency: The Educator's Freedom
of Expression after Pickering, 8 J. oF L. & EDuc. 223, 224 (1979).
' 391 U.S. at 569. The Pickering Court cited several guidelines for analyzing the conflict
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Underlying these guidelines were the Court's twin concerns of protecting
the value of an efficiently run public service while simultaneously
protecting free discussion of matters of "legitimate public concern." 10
In order to define the limits of an individual's first amendment right
to free expression in cases like Pickering, a court first must consider the
purposes behind that right."" Traditionally, the first amendment is valued
as a means to the socially desirable ends of maintaining a meaningful
democracy,1 2 as well as advancing knowledge and discovering truth.' s The
Pickering decision is premised on this "means" type of first amendment
value by including in its test whether the public employee's speech
involved a matter of "legitimate public concern."1 4 But the first
amendment is also valuable as an end in itself, as a protection of
individual dignity and opportunity for self-fulfillment through
expression.1 By failing to expressly recognize the value of the right of
between a claim to first amendment protection and the need for orderly school. administra-
tion. The Court noted that Pickering's letter was in no way directed towards any person
with whom appellant would normally be in contact in the course of her daily work. 391 U.S.
at 569-70. Additionally, there was no evidence that the letter would foster controversy
among the Board or the school community. Id. at 570. Further, the letter would have no
impact on the actual operation of the schools. The Court also noted that, most importantly,
the subject of the letter, funding of a school system, was a matter of legitimate public con-
cern. Id. at 571.
"o 391 U.S. at 568. Theoretically, the Pickering test requires that the interests of the
individual be balanced against those of society in general. See text accompanying note 8
supra. Inquiring whether the speech involves a matter of legitimate public concern, how-
ever, shifts the focus of the test from the value of an individual's first amendment freedom
to the value to society's interest in free speech. This shift risks transforming the test to a
weighing of the value to society of first amendment freedoms against the value to society of
efficient public services. In the process, the value of the first amendment freedoms to the
individual would be lost. See notes 15 & 16 infra; R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
189-99 (1977) [hereinafter cited as R. DWORKIN].
11 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 200; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 578
(1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].
" See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 9
(1966)[hereinafter cited as T. EMERSON].
'3 John Stuart Mill demonstrated that free and open discussion produces social utility.
See J. S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-118 (1974) [hereinafter cited as J.S. MILL]. Mill argued that
there are only two possible outcomes when the government seeks to suppress expression.
First, the expression may be true, in which case such expression clearly should be allowed.
When the government silences discussion, it assumes infallibility. Id. at 77. Second, even
where the expression is false, Mill points out that if the prevailing opinion is not fully and
frequently discussed, that opinion will deteriorate from living truth into dead dogma. Id. at
97. The only safeguard for our beliefs is "a standing invitation to the world to prove them
unfounded." Id. at 81; see L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 576-77.
" See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra. Pickering characterized society's interest
in having free debate on matters of public importance as the core value of the right of free
speech. 391 U.S. at 573.
15 Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), noted
that the founding fathers valued liberty as both an end and a means. The purpose of gov-
ernmental protection of freedom was to allow men to develop their faculties. Id. at 375; see
J.S. MILL, supra note 13, at 119. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Supreme
Court struck down the appellant's criminal conviction for wearing a jacket bearing an ob-
scene word in the context of a political statement, holding that the constitutional right of
19801
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free speech to the individual, Pickering's balancing test allows a first
amendment interpretation which is dangerously incomplete.16
The Fourth Circuit recently applied the Pickering balancing test in
Cooper v. Johnson.1" Cooper involved a claim brought by a county deputy
sheriff against his superior. The deputy alleged that he had been
wrongfully discharged from his job for exercising his first amendment
right to free speech. 8 The alleged protected expression was an unmailed
letter to the local newspaper which the deputy displayed to the sheriff.
The thrust of the letter was that a recent newspaper article regarding a
burglary case had unjustifiably omitted the deputy and other officers.19
Shortly after the encounter, the sheriff fired the deputy.2 0 After briefs on
the issue of whether application of the Pickering balancing test is a
matter for the judge or the jury, the district court submitted the test to
the jury.21 Following a verdict for the plaintiff, the court ruled that the
balancing test was a question of law for the judge,22 set aside the verdict,
free expression stems from the premise of individual dignity and choice which underlies our
political system. Id. at 24; see J.S. MILL, supra note 13, at 119-20; R. DWORKIN, supra note
11, at 198; Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNrrED STATES 33 (1941).
18 See note 32 infra. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, the authors of The Federalist, advo-
cated that the Constitution be ratified primarily to secure individual rights in a free govern-
ment. G. DIE=ZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 102
(1960).
17 590 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1978).
8 Id. at 560. The plaintiff in Cooper brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)
which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
See generally Developments In The Law, Section 1983 And Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rv.
1133 (1977).
The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show two elements to recover under §
1983. The plaintiff first must prove that the defendant deprived him of a right guaranteed
by the Constitution and laws of the United States and, secondly, that the defendant did so
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
In Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a case brought by female
employees charging sex discrimination, the Supreme Court held that local governing bodies,
municipal corporations, and school boards are "persons" under §. 1983. Id. at 690. Monell
overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) insofar as Monroe held that local govern-
ments were totally immune from suit under § 1983. 436 U.S. at 633. See also Campise v.
Hamilton, 382 F. Supp. 172, 183 (S.D. Tex. 1974) (sheriff is "person" for purposes of § 1983
action).
19 590 F.2d at 561.
20 Id. The sheriff had the power to remove Cooper under VA. CODE § 15.1-48 (1950).
" Cooper v. Johnson, No. 76-0523-R, 1 slip op. at 2, (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 1977) (mem.).
22 Id. The district court held that the Pickering test was a question of law for the judge
and therefore submission of the test to the jury was improper. The court reasoned that
matters of constitutional construction involving an unstructured test such as that of Picker-
ing cannot be left to the jury. The court indicated that the jury would not be able to under-
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and entered judgment for the defendant.2 3
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision.
2 4
The Fourth Circuit avoided the issue of whether the judge or the jury
should apply the Pickering test to determine if the speech was protected
by the first amendment.25 The court held that, regardless of who should
decide the issue, the speech was clearly not protected and therefore the
defendant was entitled to judgment n.o.v28 In reviewing the application
of the Pickering test, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
analysis. 27 The circuit court held that the letter by the deputy would
have a disruptive effect on the department because the letter related to a
matter of internal organization and cooperation.2 8 The Fourth Circuit
adopted the trial court's reasoning that speech on "publicly debated
matters" weighs more heavily in the Pickering balance than speech
intended to serve one's private purpose.29 Since the speech here was of a
private nature and would tend to disrupt the department, the court held
that the state interests outweighed the deputy's first amendment rights.30
stand the complexity of the Pickering test. Id. at 3. The district court cited Bertot v. School
Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975) and Norbeck v. Davenport Community School
Dist., 545 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1976) to support its holding. In No. 76-0523-R, slip op. at 2. In
Bertot, the 10th Circuit granted the plaintiff a judgment n.o.v. on the basis that the evi-
dence was such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there could be only
one reasonable conclusion. 522 F.2d at 1176. In Norbeck, the Eighth Circuit treated the
issue whether the plaintiff's expression in a § 1983 action was constitutionally protected as
one for the court. 545 F.2d at 66-67.
23 590 F.2d at 560.
24 Id.
25 See note 22 supra.
26 590 F.2d at 562. In holding that the evidence in Cooper entitled the defendant to a
judgment n.o.v., the Fourth Circuit cited Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th
Cir. 1975), for the proposition that a judgment n.o.v. is warranted when the evidence allows
only one reasonable conclusion. 590 F.2d at 562. Bertot noted that a judgment n.o.v. may
not be granted unless the evidence is susceptible of no reasonable inferences that sustain
the position of the party against whom the motion is made. 522 F.2d at 1176.
2 The district court in Cooper set out six factors derived from Pickering to consider in
weighing the interest of the employee in speaking and the interest of the government in
performing its functions. These factors include who was the target of the speech, whether
questions of discipline were involved, the relationship between the employee and the target
of his expression, the tendency of the expression to cause controversy, the subject matter of
the speech, and finally the relationship of the plaintiff's employment to the subject matter
of the speech. 590 F.2d at 561; see note 9 supra.
28 590 F.2d at 562.
29 Id.; see 391 U.S. at 571; note 10 supra. A standard for protecting free expression
which depends upon classification of speech as public or personal is difficult, if not impossi-
ble to apply. Speech may be both private and public. As Justice Widener pointed out in his
dissent in Cooper, a reasonable person could construe the deputy's letter as addressing a
matter of public concern such as the accuracy of newspaper reporting. 590 F.2d at 563. See
also Givharn v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979). In Givham, the
Supreme Court held. that a public employee does not lose his protection against governmen-
tal abridgement of freedom of speech by expressing himself privately. Id. at 415-16.
30 590 F.2d at 562.
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The Pickering balancing test, as interpreted in Cooper, is difficult to
apply 1 and risks sacrificing the value of individual first amendment
freedoms to the interests of society. 2 The Fourth Circuit's decision in
Jannetta v. Cole,s3 when contrasted with Cooper, illustrates the
inconsistency and unpredictability resulting from Pickering's balancing
analysis. In Jannetta, a white fireman brought suit claiming that he had
been fired for circulating a petition questioning the promotion of a black
fireman with less seniority than the plaintiff.3 4 The Fourth Circuit framed
the issue as whether there was an interference with the efficiency of the
public services performed by the fire department as a result of the
petition.3 5 The court held that there was no such interference and that
the plaintiff was entitled to first amendment protection. The Fourth
Circuit noted that, merely because the petition involved internal
bickering within the department, the petition still commanded first
amendment protection.3 7 The Jannetta interpretation of Pickering
focused on whether the speech caused significant interference with the
public service.38  By disregarding whether the nature of the
communication is public or private, except with regard to the
communication's effect on the public service, the Janetta analysis avoids
the extreme difficulty of making that distinction.39 More importantly,
Jannetta protects the value of the right to free expression to the
individual,40 denying protection only when the communication clearly
3' See note 29 supra. Pickering's balancing test is not a general standard but is instead
an indication of the general lines along which an analysis should run. 391 U.S. at 569. The
unstructured nature of the test leaves a court on its own to strike a general balance in light
of its own best judgment. See T. EMERSON, supra note 13, at 54. The Supreme Court has
recognized the difficulty with a balancing analysis in the libel area. In Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court noted that ad hoc balancing would lead to un-
predictable results and render the Court's duty to supervise the lower courts unmanageable.
Id. at 343.
11 See note 10 supra. In addressing whether the Constitution protects a public em-
ployee's statement, the unstructured nature of the Pickering test allows a court to reach
either conclusion in almost every case. Courts are therefore vulnerable to arguments that
the interests of society outweigh an individual's claim to free speech, as illustrated by
Cooper. See T. EMERSON, supra note 12, at 54; R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 198-200. But
see L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 600-01.
33 493 F.2d 1334 (4th Cir. 1974).
3' Id. at 1336.
35 Id. at 1336-37.
16 Id. at 1337.
37 Id. at 1337 n.5. The Jannetta court noted that the first amendment is not limited to
issues of great social or political impact. Id. This position accords with the value of the right
to free expression to the individual. See note 15 supra. The Jannetta court's protection of
the plaintiff's right to circulate and present his petition is inconsistent with the Fourth Cir-
cuit's subsequent reliance on the private, employmental nature of the plaintiff's speech in
Cooper to deny him first amendment protection. See text accompanying notes 28 & 29
supra.
38 493 F.2d at 1337.
3' See text accompanying notes 28 & 29 supra.
40 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
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interferes with the efficient operation of the public service.4 1
Janetta's analysis focuses on the effect of the communication instead
of its content and thereby eliminates many of the inherent weaknesses of
the Pickering balancing test.42 Conversely, Cooper illustrates the
difficulty"3 and danger 44 of attempting to classify speech as public or
private. By giving a more definite standard for determining when
expression is protected by the first amendment,45 Jannetta better
preserves the guarantee of free speech as a meaninkful right to the
individual. The Cooper decision sacrifices the individual's right to the
interests of society and thereby reduces the first amendment right to a
mere weight in an abstract balance.
MARK A. WILLIAMS
B. Implied Cause of Action for Damages Under the Fourteenth
Amendment
The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' Pursuant to the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment,2 Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. section 1983 which provides that every
"person" who acts under color of state law to deprive another of his con-
stitutional rights shall be liable to the injured party.3 Prior to 1978, the
Supreme Cdurt had held consistently that a municipality was not a "per-
son" within the meaning of section 1983 and thereby was immune from
suit under that statute.4 In Monell v. Department of Social Services,
5
41 493 F.2d 1337.
42 See notes 31 & 32 supra.
42 See note 29 supra.
4 See note 32 supra.
45 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment also provides that no state
shall make or enforce any law which abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States. Id.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 empowers Congress to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides a remedy against any "person" who
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any United States citizen to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. Id. Congress enacted the fore-
runner of § 1983 in 1871. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13; Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 502 (1978). 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) grants original jurisdiction to the
district courts of § 1983 suits to redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by
the Constitution or by any act of Congress providing for equal rights. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1976).
4 See, e.g., Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961). In Monroe, the plaintiffs sued the city of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)
1980]
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however, the Court overruled its earlier decisions and held that a munici-
pality could be sued under section 1983 for legal or equitable relief when
the allegedly unconstitutional action effectuates an official policy, ordi-
nance, regulation or decision.6 According to Monell, municipalities retain
immunity from vicarious liability based solely on the misconduct of their
employees and are thereby protected from suits filed under a theory of
respondeat superior.7 The municipal immunity retained under section
1983 after Monell might foreclose relief to an otherwise deserving plain-
tiff if another cause of action does not exist. Although 28 U.S.C. section
1331 grants jurisdiction to district courts for suits involving federal ques-
tions and amounts in controversy in excess of $10,000,8 there is no statute
other than section 1983 which allows an individual to assert a cause of
action for fourteenth amendment violations under federal question juris-
diction. Whether a complaint states a cause of action is a matter of law to
be decided after jurisdiction has been assumed by the court.9 In the re-
cent case of Cale v. Covington,1" the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as-
sumed jurisdiction but held that the fourteenth amendment alone does
not imply a cause of action for damages against a municipality.1
for the unlawful search of their house'by thirteen city police officers. 365 U.S. at 169. The
Supreme Court approved the dismissal of the complaint against the city, holding that the
congressional response to a proposal calling for municipal liability was so negative that the
Court was unable to believe that "person" in § 1983 was intended to include municipalities.
Id. at.191. In Moor, the Court refused to recognize a cause of action against a county under
§ 1983 even though the county was subject to vicarious liability under California state law.
411 U.S. at 707-10; see CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(a). See also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412
U.S. 507 (1973).
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
0 Id. at 691. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, the Court reconsidered the
congressional debates relating to § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)) and concluded that Congress intended "person" to include municipali-
ties. 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
7 436 U.S. at 663 n.7; see id. at 691-95.
0 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976). Section 1331 grants original jurisdiction to the federal
district courts over all suits in which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000 and the
matter at issue arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id.
9 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
10 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978).
11 Id. at 313; see note 6 supra. The Supreme Court has recognized but failed to decide
the question whether an implied cause of action exists under the fourteenth amendment
which would not be bound by the limitations of municipal immunity under § 1983. See Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). Commentators disagree on
whether Monell reflects the Court's unwillingness to approve an implied cause of action
against local governments. Compare Note, Monell v. Department of Social Services: Munici-
pal Liability for § 1983 Actions, 10 U. TOL. L. REv. 519, 537 (1979) (Court chose to avoid
Bivens analogy) with Comment, Post - Monell Viability of Implied Fourteenth Amendment
Cause of Action Against Municipalities and Exercise of Pendent Jurisdiction Over State
Law Tort Claims Against Municipalities in the Third Circuit, 24 VELL. L. Rav. 314, 328
(1979) (Monell substantiates viability of fourteenth amendment implied cause of action).
The argument has been made that policy considerations persuaded lower federal courts to
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The plaintiff in Cale was a police officer discharged from his duties by
the Chief of Police of Covington, Virginia.1 2 Cale sued the city rather
than the Police Chief, claiming that his discharge by the Chief as the
city's employee without notice or a hearing was a denial of due process
under the fourteenth amendment.13 The officer. asserted jurisdiction
under section 1331 and sought damages of $50,000.14 The district court
considered Cale's complaint a suit for relief under section 1983 and
granted the city summary judgment, concluding that the city was not a
"person" within the meaning of the statute. 6 On appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed three issues.1 6 First, the court considered whether the dis-
trict court's judgment should be affected by the subsequent Supreme
Court decision in Monell.'7 Second, the court considered whether the
amount in controversy was sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdic-
tion.1 8 Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's assertion that
the fourteenth amendment implies a cause of action for damages against
a municipality for the act of its employee.1 9
At the time of the district court's decision in Cale, a municipality
could not be sued under section 1983.20 The district court properly
granted the city's motion for summary judgment by applying the law as it
stood at the time.21 The Fourth Circuit concluded, however, that it was
required to apply the law as it existed at the time of its decision on ap-
peal.22 Because the intervening Monell decision reduced the immunity of
municipalities under section 1983, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower
court's decision and remanded Cale for consideration under section 1983
in light of Monell.
23
On appeal, the city of Covington argued that Cale's actual damages
were less than the $10,000 amount necessary for jurisdiction under sec-
circumvent immunity long before Monell. See generally Note, Monell v. Department of So-
cial Services: A Supreme Court Adoption of Lower Court Exceptions, 1979 UTAH L. REv.
251. Circumvention was effected by assertions of substantive claims other than those arising
under § 1983 and based on jurisdictional statutes such as § 1331. See Blum, From Monroe
to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 409,
414 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Blum]; notes 67-69 infra; see, e.g., Pitrone v. Mercadante,
572 F.2d 98, 99-100 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1978); Gainer v. Giarrusso, 571
F.2d 1330, 1338-41 (5th Cir. 1978).
:2 586 F.2d at 312.
3 Id. at 313.




16 Id. at 312-13.
" Id. at 313-18.
:0 Id. at 312.
21 Id.
22 Id.; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76 (1975). Federal courts must apply the law as it
stands at the time of decision unless to do so would result in manifest injustice or unless
there is contrary statutory direction or legislative history. Id.
23 586 F.2d at 312.
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tion 1331.4 The city maintained that Cale's claim of $50,000 in damages
should be reduced to the extent of his wages obtained during employment
subsequent to his discharge.2 5 The Fourth Circuit upheld its jurisdiction,
holding that the sum claimed by the plaintiff is controlling for jurisdic-
tional purposes if made in good faith and if not appearing to a legal cer-
tainty to be insufficient.
2 6
Although section 1983 clearly allowed Cale to sue the Chief of Police
and possibly permitted suit against the city of Covington, 27 the plaintiff
maintained that he could assert a cause of action against the city under
the fourteenth amendment alone.28 The Fourth Circuit rejected Cale's
contention,2 9 reasoning that the fourteenth amendment's enforcement
clause,"° Supreme Court precedent,$' and lower court rulings3 2 failed to
support an implied cause of action for damages under the fourteenth
amendment.3 The Cale court distinguished jurisdiction from cause of ac-
tion, " emphasizing that the federal question jurisdictional grant under
section 1331 does not create a cause of action.3 5 Section 1331 establishes
jurisdiction for the federal courts to hear complaints, to determine
whether a complaint states a cause of action, and to proceed on the mer-
its only if a cause of action has been determined to exist.38 The court
determined that jurisdiction was properly invoked in Cale, but concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to state a valid cause of action.
3 7
To determine the propriety of an implied cause of action, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment indicates that the framers intended for Congress to provide reme-
dies for violations of the amendment rather than the courts." The Fourth
Circuit recognized that shortly after its adoption, the fourteenth amend-
ment was acknowledged as the first instance in United States history in
which Congress had been given power to enforce by legislation express
prohibitions against the states.3 9 Since the power of judicial review only
24 Id. at 313; see note 8 supra.
25 586 F.2d at 313.
26 Id.; St. Paul Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); see Gomez v.
Wilson, 477 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1967).
27 586 F.2d at 312, 314.
28 Id. at 313-14.
29 Id. at 317.
30 Id. at 313-16; see note 2 supra; notes 43-45 infra.
" Id. at 313, 315-17.
32 Id. at 314-15.
3 Id. at 313.
3, Id. at 313-14.
35 Id. at 313. See generally Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-16 (1969); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 786 (2d ed. 1973).
38 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946).
1 586 F.2d at 314, 317.
Id. at 315-18; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
39 586 F.2d at 316; see The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 45-46 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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allows federal courts to declare state statutes or actions unconstitu-
tional,'40 the Cale court reasoned that the enforcement clause gave Con-
gress power to afford affirmative relief which was not available under
traditional exercise of judicial review.41 The Fourth Circuit carefully dis-
tinguished protection of the fourteenth amendment guarantees from the
remedy for violation of those guarantees.42 The enforcement clause con-
templates congressional legislation to implement the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment.43 Supreme Court decisions following the ratifica-
tion of the amendment indicate that congressional power to enforce the
prohibitions is virtually exclusive. 44 The Fourth Circuit's refusal to ap-
prove an implied cause of action comports with the Supreme Court's re-
luctance to judge state action before Congress has exercised its power
under the enforcement clause or before state courts have deprived indi-
viduals of due process or equal protection rights under the fourteenth
amendment.
45
In Cale, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that prior to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents,46 the Supreme Court had only once approved
the recovery of damages under the Constitution alone.47 In Bivens, the
40 See 586 F.2d at 316-17; note 39 supra. Chief Justice Marshall confirmed the judici-
ary's power of judicial review under the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137
(1803). See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 352 (1816).
41 586 F.2d at 316.
42 Id. at 316-17. States are incapable of providing immunity for their officers who act in
violation of the Federal Constitution. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
43 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880). Congress is authorized to enforce the
fourteenth amendment prohibitions by whatever legislation is appropriate to reach the ends
contemplated by the amendment. Id. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the
Court concluded that § 5 of the fourteenth amendment provided Congress with the same
broad powers encompassed by the necessary and proper clause. Id. at 650; see McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). Congress may enact legislation that has legitimate
ends, appropriate means, and which is consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion. Id.; 384 U.S. at 650-51; see Development, Congressional Power Under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 885, 886 (1973).
4' See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 11 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880). In Ex parte Virginia, the
Court acknowledged that the absence of the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment might justify an argument that § 1 does no more than state a moral duty. 100 U.S. at
347-48; see note 2 supra. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court emphasized that not
only does the fourteenth amendment restrict state action, but that § 5 vests Congress with
power to correct the effects of prohibited state action. 109 U.S. at 11; see note 43 supra. See
also Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1872).
45 See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1872). In the Slaughter-House Cases,
the Court acknowledged the power of Congress to enforce the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment if states did not conform to the amendment's requirements. Id. The
Court recognized, however, that its role with respect to the states was limited to determin-
ing the validity of state laws or court action. Id. See also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883).
" 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
47 586 F.2d at 317; see Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); Dellinger, Of Rights
and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1542 (1972) [hereinaf-
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Supreme Court allowed the recovery of damages on a claim for unlawful
search and arrest under the fourth amendment.4 The plaintiff's claim
against the six federal agents was based on the fourth amendment itself
because there was no explicit statutory provision allowing a suit against
federal agents acting under color of government authority.4 9 The Court
approved recovery based on the historical recognition of damages as the
ordinary remedy for invasions of personal liberty"0 and the power of fed-
eral courts to provide a remedy where there is a general statutory right to
sue.5 1 In addition, the Court approved the implied remedy because feder-
al fiscal policy would be unaffected 2 and because no "special factors" in-
dicated that the Court should hesitate in the absence of congressional
action.
5 8
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Bivens on two grounds.54 First, the
fourteenth amendment specifically provides for congressional action,
whereas the fourth amendment, the basis for the plaintiff's claim in Biv-
ter cited as Dellinger]; text accompanying notes 48-53 infra. Although the Supreme Court
has never decided whether an implied cause of action for damages exists under the four-
teenth amendment, see 586 F.2d at 317, one commentator has suggested without explana-
tion that the Court's power to create a damage remedy under the Constitution would be
relatively easy to establish. See Dellinger, supra at 1542. In Jacobs, the Supreme Court
allowed the recovery of compensation under the fifth amendment subsequent to the govern-
ment's exercise of its power of eminent domain. 290 U.S. at 16. The fifth amendment specif-
ically provides that no property shall be taken without just compensation. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's suggestions in Cale that the fifth amendment
implied cause of action issue was not addressed in Jacobs, 586 F.2d at 317, the Supreme
Court expressly stated that the compensation remedy rested upon the fifth amendment as
an implied promise to pay and did not require statutory recognition. 290 U.S. at 16; see
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979). See generally text accompanying notes 62-65
infra.
" 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
49 See 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
50 Id. at 395.
51 Id. at 396. In Bivens, the government sought to distinguish Jacobs v. United States,
290 U.S. 13 (1933), see note 47 supra, on the grounds that money damages were expressly
provided for by the fifth amendment and that the plaintiffs had no other possible remedy.
Dellinger, supra note 47, at 1542 n.58.
52 403 U.S. at 396. Where a federal fiscal policy question is involved, the courts may
refuse to infer a cause of action for damages absent a statute. See United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 314-17 (1947). In Standard Oil, the Court denied recovery to the
Government for the loss of services of a soldier hit by a truck. See id. at 304. The Court
reasoned that Congress has almost exclusive control of fiscal affairs and when necessary, will
act to prevent interference with federal funds. Id. at 314-15.
53 403 U.S. at 396. In Bivens, the Court emphasized that there was no express congres-
sional declaration prohibiting the recovery of money damages under the fourth amendment
from federal agents who have violated the amendment. Id. at 397. The Court did not clearly
establish, however, what "special factors" other than federal fiscal policy might counsel hesi-
tation in inferring a cause of action in the absence of congressional action. See id. at 396.
See 586 F.2d at 317.
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ens, does not.5 5 By enacting section 1983 pursuant to the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment, Congress had expressly provided a
remedy and taken the "affirmative action" which was not present in Biv-
ens.5 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that its approval of an implied cause
of action against a municipality might contravene the fiscal policymaking
of Congress evidenced by section 1983's limited immunity for municipali-
ties. 57 Whereas the Bivens suit was directed against private individuals,
Cale's suit was directed at the city of Covington.5" If Cale were to recover,
the taxpayers would ultimately pay for that recovery.59 The Cale court
was also reluctant to create a judicial remedy that might later conflict
with congressional action.6 0 If Congress subsequently provided a remedy
different from the judicial remedy, the federal courts likely would be in
the difficult position of having to determine whether the judicial remedy:
or the congressional remedy would control.6 1
The Supreme Court recently applied the Bivens rationale to approve a
damage remedy under the due process clause of the fifth amendment in
Davis v. Passman.6 2 The plaintiff contended that her discharge from the
staff of a U.S. Congressman was based on sex discrimination in violation
55 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11 586 F.2d at 317; see note 51 supra.
", 586 F.2d at 317. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the enforceability of a judicial
decision affecting fiscal policy concerns may be open to serious question. Id. Prior to Mo-
nell's recognition of municipalities as "persons" for § 1983 purposes, one commentator sug-
gested that the fashioning of an independent damage remedy against municipalities by the
judiciary would be contrary to basic notions of proper judicial functioning. Comment, Im-
plying a Damage Remedy Against Municipalities Directly Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: Congressional Action as an Obstacle to Extension of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 Mn. L.
REV. 123, 127, 152 (1976). Another commentator has argued to the contrary that the judici-
ary is unable to fulfill its function unless it can provide relief and that the Fourth Circuit's
remand in Cale may deny the plaintiff any remedy. See Note, Judicial Refusal to Imply a
Cause of Action Against Municipality Under Fourteenth Amendment After Monel - Cale
v. Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978), 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1150, 1156 n.29 (1979)
(citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)).
" See 586 F.2d at 317.
51 Id. Section 1983, as construed by Monell, provides for a cause of action against a
municipal employee in circumstances which may not allow suit against the municipality for
the same violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id.; see text accompanying notes 5-6
supra.
60 586 F.2d at 317-18. In Cale, the plaintiff had an alternative remedy under § 1983.
However, Cale could only have asserted a cause of action against the city under § 1983 if his
theory for recovery were other than respondeat superior. See text accompanying notes 6-7
supra. Although Cale could have sued the Chief of Police, 586 F.2d at 314, recovery might
be precluded by the Chief's judgment-proof status. Commentators have argued that the Su-
preme Court's limitation of municipal liability to other than respondeat superior grounds
was unconvincing because its distinction between direct and vicarious liability was invalid.
See Blum, supra note 11, at 412-13; Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 213, 215 n.15 (1979).
" 586 F.2d at 318.
62 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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of the fifth amendment.63 The Court reasoned that those without other
effective means to vindicate constitutional rights must be allowed to in-
voke the jurisdiction of the courts.6 4 Although Davis did not involve mu-
nicipalities or the fourteenth amendment, the Court's opinion does not
foreclose the possibility of implied causes of action in cases like Cale.6
The Fourth Circuit's decision not to infer a cause of action under the
fourteenth amendment placed it in the minority among the circuits.66 The
Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have relied on Bivens to expressly ap-
prove implied causes of action under the fourteenth amendment.6 7 Al-
though the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have not directly ad-
dressed the issue, opinions in those circuits have suggested approval of an
S Id. at 2267-68.
6, Id. at 242.
61 In Davis, the Court noted that injunctions were often issued to restrain state officers
from violating the fourteenth amendment. Id. The Davis Court concluded that damages
were appropriate because damages are the historical remedy for invasions of personal liberty
interests and because the plaintiff lacked other possible forms of relief, including reinstate-
ment. Id. at 245. The Court also emphasized that the relevant statute did not expressly
foreclose alternative remedies. Id. at 246-47. The Court did suggest that the judiciary's
power to enforce constitutional guarantees might not be presumed if the Constitution ex-
plicitly committed an issue to a different government branch. See id. at 242.
66 586 F.2d at 314-15.
67 Id.; see Gentile v. Wallen, 562 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1977); Owen v. City of Independence,
560 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S. 902, affd on other grounds,
589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975). See also
Rowe v. Tennessee, 609 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1979); Gordon v. City of Warren, 579 F.2d 386
(6th Cir. 1978). But see Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979); Turpin v. Mallet, 591
F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 F.2d 622 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979). In Gentile, an elementary school teacher was denied tenure and
discharged. 562 F.2d at 194. The teacher sued directly under the fourteenth amendment
with jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 562 F.2d at 195. Although the Second Circuit
affirmed judgment against the plaintiff, id. at 198, the court approved the implied cause of
action. Id. at 196-97. In Hanna, the plaintiffs sued Euclid, Ohio under the fourth amend-
ment for unreasonable searches of their homes by municipal building inspectors. 514 F.2d at
394. Although the Sixth Circuit did not mention the fourteenth amendment, the court rec-
ognized the cause of action with jurisdiction based on § 1331 apparently by applying the
fourth amendment to the municipality via the fourteenth. Id. at 398. In Owen, the Chief of
Police was discharged and brought suit against the city claiming a violation of due process.
560 F.2d at 926. Based on Monell, the Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded that there was
no reason to infer a cause of action under the fourteenth amendment because the plaintiff
could sue the city directly under § 1983. 589 F.2d at 337. Prior to Monell, however, the court
had approved a fourteenth amendment implied cause of action based on Bivens. 560 F.2d at
932-33.
In Turpin, the Second Circuit refused to infer an implied cause of action against a
municipality under the fourteenth amendment. 591 F.2d at 427. The court held that Monell
allowed the plaintiff to proceed under § 1983. Id. Similarly, in Holley, the Second Circuit
did not decide the implied cause of action issue under the fourteenth amendment because it
was unnecessary for the court's judgment. 605 F.2d at 648. In Jones, the plaintiff sued the
city of Memphis for his illegal arrest and beating by city police officers. 586 F.2d at 623.
Based on the rationale of Monell, the Sixth Circuit disapproved an implied fourteenth
amendment action on a respondeat superior theory. Id. at 625.
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
implied cause of action under the fourteenth amendment."' Those courts
approving an implied cause of action have reasoned broadly that where
there is a general right to sue, courts may use any available remedy if
Congress has not limited the plaintiff to congressional remedies.69 How-
ever, the Fourth Circuit's disapproval of an implied cause of action is
consistent with the First Circuit's conclusion that judicial approval of
municipal liability under the fourteenth amendment alone, contrary to
6" 586 F.2d at 315. In Roane v. Callisburg Indep. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.
1975), the Fifth Circuit concluded that jurisdiction under § 1331 may be appropriate for a
suit alleging discharge from employment in violation of fourteenth amendment due process.
Id. at 635 n.1. In Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Bd., 545 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1977), the
court noted that jurisdiction over a school district exists under § 1331 for a suit for due
process violations upon an employee's dismissal. Id. at 531 n.7. In Hostrop v. Bd. of Jr.
College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976), the
Seventh Circuit held that the discharge of a junior college president without due process
entitled the plaintiff to damages in a suit under § 1331. Id. at 577, 579. In Fitzgerald v.
Porter Mem. Hosp., 523 F.2d 716 (7th Cir 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976), the court
noted that a suit against the hospital could probably be maintained under the fourteenth
amendment via § 1331. Id. at 718 n.7. In Gray v. Union Co. Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520
F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit held that a teacher whose contract had not been
renewed met the requirement of § 1331 in an action alleging the violation of her first
amendment and due process rights. Id. at 805. In Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1978), however, the court rejected an implied respondeat
superior cause of action under the fourteenth amendment against the city of Los Angeles.
Id. at 848. The Ninth Circuit concluded that § 1983 provided an adequate remedy. Id. at
853.
'9 See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 1977). Although
Owen was modified on remand from the Supreme Court to approve a cause of action under
§ 1983, see note 67 supra, the Eighth Circuit had analyzed Bivens in depth. The court had
held that the police officer discharged without a hearing stated a'cause of action under the
fourteenth amendment because the relief he sought was appropriate to vindicate his four-
teenth amendment rights. 560 F.2d at 933. The Eighth Circuit's approval of the implied
fourteenth amendment cause of action was based on its resolution of two factors emphasized
in Bivens. First, the court found the remedies sought to be necessary or appropriate to
vindicate fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 932; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Second, the court concluded that Con-
gress had not limited the plaintiff to remedies specifically provided by Congress. 560 F.2d at
932; see 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Although the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hanna v. Drobnick,
514 F.2d 393 (6th Cir. 1975), failed to rationalize its reliance on Bivens, the court's approval
of an implied cause of action was particularly appropriate since both Bivens and Hanna
involved fourth amendment claims. See id. at 397. See also Hundt, Suing Municipalities
Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 770, 777 (1975).
The Third and Tenth Circuits have not decided whether an implied cause of action
exists under the fourteenth amendment. In Putzig v. O'Neil, 577 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1978), the
plaintiffs argued that the city of Philadelphia could be held liable directly under the four-
teenth amendment with jurisdiction based on § 1331 for false arrest. Id. at 850. The Third
Circuit expressly refused to address the issue and cited two earlier decisions in which the
issue had not been decided. Id; see Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1024 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978); Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 115 n.3 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). In Mahone, the court did not decide the issue because it
concluded that an effective federal statutory remedy existed under § 1981. 564 F.2d at 1024.
In Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976), the Tenth
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what Congress has deliberately excluded from the operation of section
1983, might be inappropriate.
7 0
The Fourth Circuit's refusal to establish an implied cause of action for
damages under the fourteenth amendment removes the court from fiscal
policymaking.71 The court has deferred to congressional enforcement of
the fourteenth amendment prohibitions and has asserted for itself the
power to adjudge only the constitutionality of congressional remedies.
72
Within the Fourth Circuit, municipalities retain their immunity from lia-
bility for their employees' actions unless the actions occur pursuant to
municipal policies or decisions." For an individual otherwise deprived of
fourteenth amendment guarantees by a municipal employee, the only op-
tion available is suit against the employee under section 1983. Cale elimi-
nates the possibility of an implied fourteenth amendment cause of action
against the employee's employer.
7 4
ALAN L. BUMON
Circuit did not consider the issue of jurisdiction under § 1331 because the court had con-
cluded that no cause of action was present. Id. at 1342.
The Fourth Circuit upheld an implied cause of action for damages under the fifth
amendment in State's Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974).
In Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 429, (4th Cir. 1974), Judge Winter,
dissenting in part in the court's remand on jurisdictional grounds, suggested that jurisdic-
tion was established under § 1331 and that money damages were necessary to afford relief
for the violation of fourteenth amendment rights. Id. at 433.
70 586 F.2d at 314-15. In Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977), the First Circuit
rejected an implied fourteenth amendment cause of action in a suit against a police officer
who had shot the plaintiff's decedent. Id. at 44-45. Kostka was decided prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Monell that "person" in § 1983 included municipalities. See note 6
supra. As a result, the First Circuit argued that the exclusion of municipalities from the
scope of § 1983 should preclude independent court action contrary to Congress' apparent
intent to protect the fiscal integrity of political subdivisions. 560 F.2d at 44 n.6. The same
consideration is relevant now in light of the limited municipal immunity still remaining
under § 1983. The existence of a congressionally established remedy for fourteenth amend-
ment violations militates against extension by the judiciary. 586 F.2d at 317. Cale could
have sued the Chief of Police under § 1983. Id. at 314. In Monell, Justice Powell recognized
that the Court's decision allowed the Court to avoid deciding whether an implied cause of
action exists under the fourteenth amendment. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. at 712 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell suggested that continued adherence to an
interpretation of § 1983 providing absolute immunity for municipalities soon would require
deciding whether the § 1983 limitations could be avoided by inferring a cause of action
under the fourteenth amendment similar to that approved in Bivens. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 52 & 57 supra.
72 See notes 43-45 supra.
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); note 6 supra.
71 See 586 F.2d at 313.
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C. Political Patronage
In Elrod v. Burns,1 the Supreme Court held that the first and four-
teenth amendment guarantees of freedom of belief and association pro-
tected "nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential" government employees from
discharge or threat of discharge solely on the basis of political prefer-
ence. 2 Elrod arose in Illinois after a newly elected Democratic sheriff dis-
charged or threatened to discharge a number of employees of the Cook
1 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
',See id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring). In Elrod, the Court was unable to agree on a
majority opinion. Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality which also included Justices
White and Marshall. 427 U.S. at 349-74. The plurality reasoned that the first amendment
freedoms of belief and association and free functioning of the electoral process required
limitations on political patronage practices. Id. at 355-56; see U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV.
In a separate opinion, Justices Stewart and Blackmun concurred in the result, but main-
tained that the facts of the case did not require the plurality's extended discussion of the
patronage system, especially with regard to hiring. 427 U.S. at 374-75. Justice Stewart stated
the holding of Elrod, that nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public employees are to be pro-
tected from discharge on the sole ground of political belief. 427 U.S. at 375. Justices Stewart
and Blackmun concurred in the judgment of the plurality only to the extent that it applied
to the discharge of nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees. See id. When
no single rationale is approved by five Justices to explain the result of a Supreme Court
decision, the holding is the narrowest position taken by the members concurring in the judg-
ment. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist dissented, urging that longstanding practice and strong government
interests supported patronage practices. 427 U.S. at 375-84. Although Justice Stevens took
no part in Elrod, his opinion in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928, 410 U.S. 943 (1973), protecting nonpolicymaking em-
ployees of the Illinois Secretary of State's Office from politically motivated discharges, indi-
cated that he would concur in the result of Elrod. See id. at 576.
The Elrod plurality maintained that the government interest in implementing the poli-
cies of a new administration which are presumably supported by the electorate could be
achieved by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions. 427 U.S. at 367; note
50 infra. Recognizing that the policymaking exception required elaboration, the plurality
indicated that whether the employee's responsibilities involve administrative determinations
of office or agency direction is crucial. See 427 U.S. at 367-68. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Stewart added that the Court's prohibition against patronage discharges did not
extend to confidential employees. See id. at 375. The Fifth Circuit has held that the
nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential language of Justice Stewart's opinion established two
classes of employees subject to patronage discharges, those in policymaking positions and
those in confidential positions. See Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1040 (5th Cir.
1979). In Stegmaier, the Fifth Circuit approved the dismissal of a nonpolicymaking, confi-
dential deputy clerk, even though the principal clerk did not hold a policymaking position.
597 F.2d at 1040.
Commentators have suggested that the Elrod exceptions are overly vague and will need
to be clarified on a case-by-case basis. See Comment, Patronage Dismissals and Compelling
State Interests: Can the Policymaking/Nonpolicymaking Distinction Withstand Strict
Scrutiny?, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 278; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARM. L. R.v. 58, 194
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Term]. See also Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145 (1st Cir.
1979); Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1978); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d
825 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977). In an effort to clarify and solidify the Elrod
holding, in Branti v. Finkel, 48 U.S.L.W. 4331 (1980), a majority of the Supreme Court
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County sheriff's office who had worked for his Republican predecessor."
In Virginia, the customary practice of newly elected sheriffs is to appoint
new contingents of deputies at the start of their terms of office.4 The Vir-
ginia state code specifically empowers newly elected sheriffs to appoint
deputies to exercise the official duties of the sheriff during his term of
office. 5 These new deputies are ordinarily affiliated with the same political
party as that of the new sheriff.6 Because the Elrod Court failed to agree
on a majority opinion, federal courts have confronted the task of deter-
mining what government interests are sufficient to protect political pa-
tronage practices.8 In Ramey v. Harber,9 the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals addressed the issue of whether Elrod affects Virginia's statutorily
based custom of deputy appointment.10
On January 1, 1976 Democrat Paul T. Harber took office as the newly
elected sheriff of Lee County, Virginia.1 ' Harber refused to reappoint any
of the ten deputies of his Republican predecessor solely because of their
political beliefs and affiliations."2 Six months after Harber became sheriff
the Supreme Court decided Elrod.5 The former deputies filed suit in
agreed that the policymaking, confidential labels are not the ultimate concern. Id. at 4334.
Rather, the issue is whether the effective performance of the public office depends upon
party affiliation. Id. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Branti and was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 4331.
The Court affirmed the entry of an injunction against the termination from employment of
two assistant public defenders. Id. at 4334. Justice Stewart dissented on the grounds that
the assistants were confidential employees who could be discharged in accordance with
Elrod. See id. at 4335. Justices Powell and Rehnquist also dissented, maintaining that the
majority's standard is vague and uncertain, and contrary to substantial government inter-
ests served by political patronage. See id. at 4335-38.
3 See 427 U.S. at 350-51.
4 See Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753, 755-56 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910
(1979).
5 VA. CODE § 15.1-48 (Supp. 1979). The sheriff may remove any of his deputies at any
time. Id.
8 See 589 F.2d at 755-56.
7 See note 2 supra.
8 See, e.g., Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Bergland, 586
F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1978); McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 912 (1979); Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1977); Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555
F.2d 390 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach,
541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976).
- 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 755.
12 Id. See generally VA. CODE § 15.1-48 (Supp. 1979). In 1916, the Virginia Supreme
Court established that § 817 of the Virginia Code of 1887, the forerunner of VA. CODE §
15.1-48, provided that a deputy clerk's tenure in office terminated with the term of the
clerk. Farmer's Bank of Southwest Va. v. McGavock, 119 Va. 510, 512, 89 S.E. 949, 949
(1916). Section 15.1-48 applies to both deputy clerks and deputy sheriffs. VA. CODE § 15.1-48
(Supp. 1979). In Ramey, the Fourth Circuit stated that after an election, any deputies reap-
pointed for the new term would have to requalify and take the appointment oath. 589 F.2d
at 756.
11 589 F.2d at 755.
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September 1976, alleging that they had been denied the free exercise of
their rights of belief and association by Harber's refusal to reappoint
them.14 The district court ordered reinstatement of the deputies and the
payment of attorneys' fees."5
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the deputies claimed that they were
entitled to back pay and punitive damages and they urged the court to
declare the Virginia deputy appointment statute unconstitutional. 6 Al-
though the Fourth Circuit did not decide whether the defendant's refusal
to reappoint the plaintiff deputies was prohibited by Elrod,'7 the court
did distinguish Ramey from Elrod on two important factual grounds.'8
First, the Lee County term of appointment of the deputies is established
by statute. Second, the small size of the Lee County sheriff's office ne-
cessitates particularly supportive relations between the sheriff and his
deputies.20 Although these distinctions alone may be sufficient to render
Elrod inapplicable, 21 the Fourth Circuit concluded that Elrod should not
apply retroactively.2 Since Elrod was decided after Harber had refused
to reappoint the plaintiff deputies, the Ramey court set aside the district
court's judgment against the defendant.
2"
The Fourth Circuit applied criteria established by the Supreme Court
to determine whether Elrod was to have retroactive effect.2 4 The court
14 Id. The plaintiffs' original action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides
that any person who subjects a United States citizen to the deprivation of any constitutional
rights will be liable to that citizen in a legal, equitable, or other appropriate proceeding for
relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976); see 589 F.2d at 755.
'5 Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 670 (W.D. Va. 1977).
589 F.2d at 755.
"Id. at 757.
's See id. at 756-57.
" See VA. CODE § 15.1-48 (Supp. 1979); note 12 supra.
20 589 F.2d at 756-57.
11 See id. at 761 (Hall, J., concurring).
2 Id. at 760. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's order of reinstatement
and award of attorneys' fees and costs. Id. The court did require, however, that any rein-
stated deputies be given thirty days notice prior to the termination of their employment. Id.
22 See id.; notes 13 & 22 supra.
24 589 F.2d at 757-60; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Currier, Time
and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Leh-
man & McClatchey, The Prospectivity Doctrine: Which Way Out of the Morass?, 29 JAG J.
65 (1976); Note, Retroactivity in Civil Suits: Linkletter Modified, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 653
(1974). See generally, Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977).
In Ramey, concurring Judge Hall urged that the retroactivity issue should not be
reached unless Elrod applied to the facts in Ramey. 589 F.2d at 760-61. He maintained that
Elrod was inapplicable, listing four factual grounds discussed by the majority to distinguish
Ramey from Elrod. Id. at 761. Judge Hall noted that the deputies' terms were fixed by
statute, that the deputies had actively campaigned against the new sheriff, that no pressure
was exerted on the deputies to affiliate with the party of the new sheriff, and that the nature
of the Lee County sheriff's office was small and intimate. Id. Although the Ramey majority
agreed with the factual distinctions pointed out by Judge Hall, the court was unwilling to
conclude that the distinctions rendered Elrod inapplicable. See id. at 757.
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first considered whether Elrod established a new principle of law that was
not clearly foreseeable.25 Second, the court weighed the advantages of ret-
roactive application of the Elrod rule.26 Third, the Fourth Circuit ana-
lyzed the injustice or hardship that would result from retroactive applica-
tion of Elrod.27 Under the first inquiry, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
Elrod clearly established a new principle of law.28 The Ramey court em-
phasized the longstanding acceptance of political patronage in the United
States 29 and reasoned that Elrod overruled a 1974 Fourth Circuit decision
upholding a patronage discharge.3 0
The Fourth Circuit weighed the advantages of retroactive application
of the Elrod decision by concentrating on the appropriateness of Harber's
refusal to reappoint the ten deputies.81 The court approved the sheriff's
reliance on the deputy appointment provision 2 and the 1974 Fourth Cir-
cuit case approving patronage discharge.3 " In addition, the Ramey court
asserted that there was no indication that retroactive application would
facilitate the operation of the Elrod rule protecting the rights of political
affiliation and belief.3 ' The Fourth Circuit was convinced that the whole-
25 589 F.2d at 757-58; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 206 (1973); Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
26 589 F.2d at 758-59; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971);
Litwhiler v. Hidlay, 429 F. Supp. 984, 986 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
27 589 F.2d at 759-60; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971); Litwhiler
v. Hidlay, 429 F. Supp. 984, 987 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
28 589 F.2d at 757-58.
'9 In Elrod, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist indicated that the
Elrod holding was unexpected and almost shocking. See 427 U.S. at 375-76, 389 n.12; 589
F.2d at 757-58. They argued that for 185 years the patronage system had not been thought
to be unconstitutional. See 427 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 389 n.12 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Justice Powell contended that patronage practices have been a significant
contributor to the development of democracy in the American political system. See id. at
382. Offers of employment to supporters of successful candidates arguably encourage active
participation in politics and the maintenance of the two-party system. See O'Neil, Politics,
Patronage and Public Employment, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 725, 735 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Public Employment]; Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils System-The Judici-
ary Visits Patronage Place, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1320, 1325-26 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Spoils System]. See also CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564-67 (1973); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-
09 (1967); note 55 infra; see generally C. FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE
(1905); Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 35 (1969).
30 589 F.2d at 758. In Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 1005 (1975), the Fourth Circuit approved a patronage discharge, finding that the
plaintiff's job was properly characterized as a sensitive and nonroutine position. Id. at 1357.
Although the characterization of the plaintiff suggests that she came within the Elrod ex-
ceptions, the Ramey court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Sheriff Harber's reliance on
the Nunnery holding was misplaced. See 589 F.2d at 758 n.4.
31 See 589 F.2d at 758-59.
2 Id. at 759; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199 (1973); VA. CODE § 15.1-48
(Supp. 1979).
33 589 F.2d at 759; see note 30 supra.
34 589 F.2d at 758; see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971). See gener-
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sale reinstatement of employees not reappointed which would be required
by retroactive application of Elrod would seriously disrupt state
administration.
3 5
Under the Supreme Court's third criterion, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that retroactive application of Elrod would result in far greater
hardship for the present employees than for the plaintiffs.3 6 The court
reasoned that the present deputies hired by Sheriff Harber reasonably
expected to continue in their positions for the duration of Harber's
term.3 7 The plaintiffs knew of the customary practice in Lee County and
were fully aware that they could expect to lose their jobs if their sheriff
lost his next election.3 8 Other courts have applied Elrod retroactively
without expressly deciding the propriety of doing so,39 but the only other
court to address the issue of Elrod's retroactivity supported the Ramey
court's conclusion.
4 0
Although the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Elrod was to apply pro-
spectively resolved the suit in Ramey, the question remains whether the
Elrod rule ought to apply in circumstances similar to those in Ramey.
The Ramey court indicated that Elrod might not apply because of the
ally Note, Patronage and the First Amendment After Elrod v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L. REv.
468 (1978); 1975 Term, supra note 2, at 190; Note, Elrod v. Burns: Chipping at the Iceberg
of Political Patronage, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 225 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Chipping].
" 589 F.2d at 760. The Ramey court reasoned that thousands of patronage appoint-
ments in Virginia might be open to question if Elrod were applied retroactively. Id. Al-
though the plaintiffs contended that the statute of limitations protected most pre-Elrod
appointments from attacks, the court reasoned that the possibly large numbers of pending
cases based on pre-Elrod patronage weighed against Elrod's retroactive application. See id.
at 760 n.7.
6 Id. at 760.
" See id.; notes 5 & 12 supra.
" 589 F.2d at 760; see note 12 supra. Although the plaintiffs obtained their jobs by the
same method as the one they challenged, one commentator has argued that such employees
can nevertheless complain because they were forced to accept the patronage system in oider
to obtain employment. See 1975 Term, supra note 2, at 191.
3' In Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976), the First Cir-
cuit did not mention Elrod's retroactive application, but applied Elrod to a pre-Elrod politi-
cally motivated failure to reappoint and affirmed a damage award. Id. at 885-86. In Rosen-
thal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit held that a city employee fired
prior to Elrod had been wrongly denied a full trial to determine his status as a policymaker,
but the court made no express determination of Elrod's retroactivity. Id. at 394. In Alfaro
de Quevedo v. De Jesus Shuck, 556 F.2d 591 (1st Cir. 1977), the First Circuit concluded that
the Elrod rule did not affect a pre-Elrod discharge because the plaintiff was clearly a poli-
cymaker. Id. at 592-93. See also Retail Clerks v. Leonard, 450 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Boyce v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 447 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Guerra v. Roma
Indep. School Dist., 444 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
" Litwhiler v. Hidlay, 429 F. Supp. 984 (M.D. Pa. 1977). In Litwhiler, the district court
denied relief to a discharged clerk in the county assessor's office. Id. at 987. The court re-
fused to apply Elrod retroactively, emphasizing that chaos would result if political pa-
tronage appointments prior to Elrod were declared invalid. Id.
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factual differences between the two cases.41 The Cook County deputies
remain in office until discharged by the sheriff.42 Although the Fourth
Circuit stated that the Lee County deputy sheriffs are also nonpolicymak-
ing, nonconfidential employees, 3 the court stressed that the tenure of
employment for the deputies is governed by statute and terminates auto-
matically at the end of the sheriff's term unless the deputies are reap-
pointed.44 The Ramey court also reasoned that the Cook County sheriff's
office is less susceptible to the divisive influences of partisan politics and
resulting animosities because the Cook County office is larger and likely
to be more impersonal than the Lee County office.' 5 The Ramey court
suggested that the plaintiffs' active campaigning against the new sheriff
did not promote the atmosphere of cooperation essential to the efficient
functioning of the Lee County office.46 There was no evidence that the
Elrod deputies had campaigned for the Cook County incumbent.4 The
Fourth Circuit further emphasized the Cook County patronage require-
ment of support of the prevailing party as a condition of continued em-
ployment 8 and contrasted the lack of any such requirement in Lee
County as a condition of reappointment.
49
Despite the factual differences, the Fourth Circuit's unequivocal char-
acterization of the Lee County deputies as nonconfidential, nonpoli-
cymaking public employees,50 and Harber's refusal to reappoint the plain-
See 589 F.2d at 757.
42 See 427 U.S. at 351.
13 589 F.2d at 754.
4' See note 12 supra.
" 589 F.2d at 757.
48 Id. at 756-57.
'7 Id. at 757.
48 See 589 F.2d at 756-57; 427 U.S. at 350-51.
49 589 F.2d at 756. The distinction between the Cook County requirement of party sup-
port and the lack of such a requirement in Lee County was irrelevant with respect to the
effect on first amendment freedoms of belief and association. Employment in each case,
whether by avoiding discharge or securing reappointment, was conditioned on political affili-
ation. In Branti v. Finkel, 48 U.S.L.W. 4331 (1980), the Court held that dismissed employees
need not show actual or even apparent coercion, but that any requirement of party affilia-
tion is sufficient to activate the protection of the Elrod principle. See id. at 4333-34.
50 Id. at 754; see note 2 supra. The deputies in Ramey could conceivably be character-
ized as policymaking or confidential employees. Cf. McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869, 872
(4th Cir. 1978). In McCollum, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the close relationship be-
tween the sheriff and his deputies could allow a jury to find that a deputy operated in a
policymaking, confidential capacity, thereby exonerating the sheriff for the discharge of the
deputy. Id. at 872-73. In Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1977), the court con-
cluded that the city attorney needed loyal subordinates and that the deputy city attorney
could be discharged for lack of loyalty to the city attorney. 558 F.2d at 830-31. The Seventh
Circuit also emphasized the public interest in encouraging the policies of the city attorney
and reasoned that the deputy attorney was a policymaker because he was vested with all the
duties of the city attorney. See id. at 829-31. Although the Ramey deputies also were vested
with all the duties of the sheriff, the responsibilities of the Ramey deputies did not as
clearly fall within the policymaking function outlined by the Elrod plurality. See 427 U.S. at
367-68. The loyalty dimension mentioned in Newcomb, however, might apply in the Ramey
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tiffs solely because of their political beliefs5 ' suggest that the Elrod rule
would apply to Ramey. Since the Ramey deputies are nonpolicymaking,
nonconfidential employees, their conduct should not affect the function-
ing of the Lee County sheriff's office any more than the conduct of the
Cook County deputies should affect the operation of that office.5 2 Thus,
the Lee County deputies arguably deserve as much protection from pa-
tronage practice as the Supreme Court afforded the Cook County depu-
ties in Elrod. The only apposite factual distinction between Ramey and
Elrod is the difference between discharges and refusals to reappoint.5 3
The Elrod holding specifically applies only to discharge on patronage
grounds.5 4 The precedent upon which the Elrod Court relied indicates,
however, that the Court's disapproval of patronage discharges may extend
to refusals to reappoint.55 The Elrod Court relied upon previous decisions
circumstances to bring the deputies within the confidential exception established by the
Elrod concurrence. See id. at 375; note 2 supra. In Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027
(5th Cir. 1979), the court also emphasized loyalty and found a deputy clerk to be within the
Elrod confidential employee exception. Id. at 1040. The Fifth Circuit based its decision on
the existence of a statute empowering the deputy to conduct all the business of the clerk. Id.
The Ramey facts are strikingly similar, although Stegmaier only involved the single deputy
in the office, a circumstance in which loyalty and confidentiality may be especially impor-
tant. See id.
:1 589 F.2d at 755.
2= Office morale appears to be a special concern of the Fourth Circuit. See id. at 756-57,
760; cf. Hollifield v. McMahan, 438 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (Elrod applied despite
interest in morale). In Hollifield, the federal district court recognized the sheriff's legitimate
interest in his department's morale, but applied Elrod to hold that the discharge of a
nonpolicymaking deputy after the deputy's vigorous campaigning for an opposing sheriff
candidate violated the deputy's first amendment rights. Id. at 593. In Branti, however, the
Court held that even a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public employee may be dis-
charged because of his party affiliation if his position is political in nature. 48 U.S.L.W.
4331, 4334 (1980). The Court also indicated that a public official is free to discharge subordi-
nates from a prior administration if he lacks confidence in their loyalty for some reason
other than their party affiliation. Id. n.14. See also note 2 supra; note 59 infra.
*1 See 589 F.2d at 756-57; text accompanying note 2 supra. From the standpoint of the
employee, the practice of political patronage, whether discharge or failure to reappoint, re-
sults in the loss of employment. See 589 F.2d at 756.
:4 427 U.S. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring); see notes 2 & 53 supra.
I5 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967). In Keyishian, the Court held that a New York statute which flatly prohib-
ited teachers from joining particular political organizations was an unconstitutionally vague
attempt to keep subversives out of the schools. Id. at 603-04. The Court concluded that
membership alone without intent to promote unlawful purposes of an organization was in-
adequate grounds for discharging teachers. Id. at 606. In Perry, the Court held that the
nonrenewal of a teacher's one-year contract could not be based on the teacher's exercise of
his freedom of speech. 408 U.S. at 597-98. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
The Perry Court held further that a public school teacher is entitled to a hearing prior to
nonrenewal of his contract if he is deprived of either a "liberty" interest or a "property"
interest in continued employment by a decision not to rehire. 408 U.S. at 599.
In Elrod, concurring Justices Stewart and Blackmun relied upon Perry to establish the
narrow rule limiting patronage discharges. 427 U.S. at 375. Perry suggests that Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan would also limit
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holding that public school teachers may not be deprived of "liberty" in-
terests such as the free exercise of first amendment rights by discharge or
by a decision not to rehire."' Although the Supreme Court would not
likely limit Elrod to politically motivated discharges," a majority of the
Court has agreed that compelling government interests may justify re-
stricting the exercise of freedoms otherwise protected under the first and
fourteenth amendments.58 Nonetheless, the Elrod plurality concluded
refusals to reappoint on patronage grounds. See generally 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Given Jus-
tice Stevens' support of the Elrod principle in Branti v. Finkel, 48 U.S.L.W. 4331 (1980), a
majority of the Supreme Court would likely find the Lee County deputy appointment prac-
tice constitutionally objectionable. See note 2 supra. In Branti, the Court intimated that no
relevant distinction exists between refusals to reappoint and dismissals, but the Court con-
cluded only that the lack of a reasonable expectation of continued employment is insuffi-
cient to justify a dismissal based on political affiliation. See 48 U.S.L.W. 4331, 4332 n.6
(1980).
56 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); see note 55 supra.
"I See note 55 supra. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the payment of union
service fees is an unconstitutional condition of government employment when the employee
holds ideologically-based objections to various union activities. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977). See generally Chipping, supra note 34; Comment, Polit-
ical Patronage and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Last Hurrah for the Party Faithful?, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 720 (1973).
"' In CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), the Supreme Court held that § 9(a) of
the Hatch Act (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1976)), which restricted political
management and campaigning of federal employees, was not unconstitutionally overbroad.
413 U.S. 548, 575-80 (1973); see United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99 (1949).
The Court maintained that employment by the federal government should turn on merit
rather than political activity and the political influence of federal employees should be lim-
ited. 413 U.S. at 557. The Hatch Act forbids only that political activity of federal employees
considered detrimental to efficiency. 330 U.S. at 99. In Letter Carriers, the Court recognized
that the Hatch Act promoted the government interests in efficiency and establishing an
unbiased bureaucracy in which federal employees are to act without favoritism toward any
political group. See 413 U.S. at 564-65.
The Supreme Court requires the application of a test of "strict judicial scrutiny" when
state action interferes with the free exercise of some fundamental personal right or liberty
or when state action creates a "suspect" classification which discriminates against a discrete
and insular minority. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17, 37-38 (1973); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-102 (1943); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942). Only when a compelling state interest is involved will the state action
be constitutional. See 424 U.S. 1, 25, 55 (1976); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 253-54 (1974); 411 U.S. 1, 97-98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The state action
cannot unnecessarily burden constitutional interests. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438,
444 (1963).
The Elrod plurality indicated that the strict scrutiny standard shall be employed to
determine when government interests are sufficiently compelling to require support of the
governing party by employees. 427 U.S. at 363. According to the plurality, requiring political
support by employees would be constitutional when some vital government purpose is
served, when the means are the least restrictive of first amendment rights, and when the
benefit outweighs the loss of the rights of the individual. Id.
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that the government interests in efficiency, policy implementation, and
preservation of the two-party system are not promoted by low-level polit-
ical patronage and thus, do not require judicial protection of such pa-
tronage.59 Given the Court's failure to agree on an opinion in Elrod,60
however, and the Court's recent expansion of the Elrod holding,6 1 it is not
clear what deference the Court would extend to a state statute such as
the Virginia deputy appointment provision which serves to legitimize po-
litical patronage hiring.
62
The Fourth Circuit avoided potential widespread disruption through-
out Virginia by applying Supreme Court standards to find that Elrod's
prohibition against patronage discharges should not apply retroactively.
6 3
With the passage of time, the effect of the Ramey decision regarding
Elrod's nonretroactive application will be minimized because fewer pre-
EIrod claims will be asserted. The issues raised in the factual setting of
Ramey, however, will require further refinement of the Elrod holding.
Whether appointment or failure to reappoint on political patronage
grounds is proscribed by the Elrod principle is an issue yet to be decided.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of the factual distinctions in Ramey indi-
cates that the most significant remaining issue is determination of the
government interests that are sufficiently compelling to override Elrod's
protection of political belief and association.
ALAN L. BUTrON.
See 427 U.S. at 364-69. See also Public Employment, supra note 29, at 735; Spoils
System, supra note 29, at 1342-47.
Reasoning that less intrusive means are available to achieve accountability to the pub-
lic, the plurality rejected the suggestion that political patronage ensures the efficient and
effective functioning of government. 427 U.S. at 364-67.In Branti v. Finkel, 48 U.S.L.W.
4331 (1980), however, the Court indicated that an employee's first amendment rights might
be subordinated to the government interests in efficiency and effectiveness if his political
beliefs interfered with the discharge of his duties. Id. at 4334. A federal district court has
held that Elrod did not prevent the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from adopting a rule al-
lowing the termination of public employees at will on nonpatronage grounds in order to
promote efficient government administration. Covert v. Redevelopment Auth. of Hunting-
don, 447 F. Supp. 270, 274 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
60 See note 2 supra.
61 See Branti v. Finkel, 48 U.S.L.W. 4331 (1980); notes 2, 49, 52, 55, & 59 supra.
6 See VA. CODE § 15.1-48 (Supp. 1979); notes 58-59 supra.
63 589 F.2d at 760. In circumstances analogous to Ramey and Elrod, the Supreme Court
has chosen to apply its decisions prospectively only. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969), the Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute which only allowed property
taxpayers to vote on the issuance of revenue bonds. Id. at 702. The Court refused to give the
decision full retroactive effect, noting that significant hardship would result to cities, bond-
holders and others. Id. at 706. See also City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 213-14
(1970) (electoral procedures relating to municipal financing declared unconstitutional); Al-
len v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 571-72 (1969) (elections for local officials under
possibly discriminatory voting laws).
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